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THE PROBLEM OF 'THE JUDGE WHO MAKES
THE CASE HIS OWN": NOTIONS OF JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY AND JUDICIAL LIABILITY IN
ANCIENT ROME
Marie Adornetto Monahan*
Judicial misconduct has increasingly become the subject of public and
legal scrutiny. The American Bar Association has promulgated rules
that restrict judges' personal and professional conduct! Presumably,
judges' personal and professional lives are inseverable because judges
are neutral public servants. Society entrusts judges with the duty of pro-
viding an outcome based on fair and impartial evaluation of a given di-
lemma. If the outcome is unfair and partial, society expects the legal and
political systems to provide a remedy. Judges, however, generally are
not subject to civil liability for acts of misconduct because the doctrine of
judicial immunity protects them.
In American jurisprudence, the doctrine of judicial immunity is very
inclusive; therefore, any actual instance of civil liability for a judge is
rare. Our society, however, has a very broad based system of judicial ac-
countability for acts of misconduct, including appeal, criminal prosecu-
tion, and various kinds of discipline. Because these sanctions intend to
correct the system rather than compensate individual loss, society views
judicial misconduct primarily as an offense against the public and the le-
gal system, rather than an offense against any individual member of
society.
Ancient Roman culture experienced a remarkably similar phenome-
non. In ancient Rome, the public held judges accountable under very
limited circumstances, similar to the limited accountability of judges un-
der the American doctrine of judicial immunity today. Initially, Roman
judges were liable only for intentional conduct, such as bribery, that re-
ceived a punishment of death. Eventually, the basis for judicial liability
extended to unintentional conduct, such as negligence, which coincided
with a less severe punishment-a fine as opposed to the death penalty.
Concurrent with this growth of a more broad-based accountability for
Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.
1. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1980).
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judicial misconduct was the development of an appeals system in Roman
law.
This Article proposes that although the basis for judicial liability in
Roman culture broadened to allow an aggrieved litigant to redress a
wrong, the corresponding sanctions diminished in severity in an effort to
define judicial misconduct as an offense to society rather than a personal
wrong deserving of violent retribution. First, this Article discusses the
American doctrine of judicial immunity and the legal system's response
to the problem of judicial misconduct today. Then, this Article examines
the basis of the American doctrine: the Roman approach to judicial mis-
conduct, and the corresponding sanctions through the Republican, Clas-
sical, and post-Classical Periods.
I. LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT IN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Development of the Doctrine of Judicial Immunity
The doctrine of American judicial immunity has its immediate roots in
English common law.2 Relevant to the origins of the doctrine in Roman
law, the doctrine of judicial immunity developed in English law in his-
torical and political symmetry with the development of an appeal system.
Before an established system of appeal, litigants were limited to attack-
ing the judgment as false and seeking a fine or amercement against the
judge in question.' Once the appellate process granted litigants a means
of recourse, it was no longer procedurally necessary to seek relief from
erroneous or unfounded judgments by attacking the source of those deci-
sions: the judge. In a seminal decision during the development of the
English doctrine, Lord Coke articulated one of the policy reasons un-
derlying judicial immunity as the need for finality of judgments, an "end
of causes.",4 Significantly, the historical development of an appeals sys-
tem parallels the concept of judicial immunity as it expanded in both the
American legal system and in Roman law.
2. For a thorough history of judicial immunity in our legal system and its origins in
English law, see J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Starkman and the History of Judicial Immu-
nity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 881-96 (1980). See generally Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen,
Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REV. 201 (1980); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial
Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1990).
3. See Shaman, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (K.B. 1907); see also Block, supra note
2, at 885-87; Shaman, supra note 2, at 3; Michael Robert King, Note, Judicial Immunity
and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 549, 551-52
(1978).
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In 1871, the United States Supreme Court decided Bradley v. Fisher,
defining judicial immunity as it exists in the United States today. Under
this doctrine, judges are immune from civil liability for judicial acts per-
formed within the jurisdiction of the court, no matter how erroneous the
act or how harmful its consequences.6 This immunity applies to state and
federal judges of all levels,7 whether of general or specific jurisdiction.8
In addition to the need for finality of judgments, a primary purpose of
the doctrine in the American legal system is to protect judicial independ-
ence.9 Underlying this policy is the assumption that in order for judges to
be truly impartial, they must be free to exercise their authority without
fear of personal consequences." In keeping with this policy, judges re-
main immune from civil liability for judicial acts regardless of their mo-
tive in performing such acts. If the law held judges liable upon a requi-
site showing of intent, disappointed parties could force judges into court
merely by alleging partiality, malice, or corruption, and thereby defeat
the goal of judicial independence. Thus, to ensure judicial independ-
ence, the doctrine must protect even the occasional corrupt judge.
Because the doctrine ensures that judges will decide cases impartially,
rather than out of fear of being sued, it benefits society as a whole.
5. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of ju-
dicial immunity in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 537 (1868), where the Court
suggested that judges might be liable for judicial acts performed both maliciously or cor-
ruptly and in excess of jurisdiction. In Bradley, however, the Court clearly rejected this
notion. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350-51.
6. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
355-56 (1978).
7. See Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1447 (5th Cir. 1983); Brewer v. Black-
well, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982); Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 94-97 (5th Cir.
1980).
8. See Turner, 611 F.2d at 97. When the Supreme Court first adopted the doctrine
of judicial immunity, it distinguished between courts of general and limited jurisdiction.
See Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 535-36. For an explanation of the abolishment of this dis-
tinction, see Block, supra note 2, at 892-96.
9. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988); Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
347; Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536. Some courts offer the need for finality of judgments
as another policy reason justifying the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 564 & n.4 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517,
522 (5th Cir. 1985); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 856 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
Shaman, supra note 2, at 4.
10. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 564 & n.4; Holloway, 765 F.2d at 522; Harper, 638 F.2d at
856 & n.10.
11. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228; Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56; Bradley, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 347.
12. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 349; Holloway, 765 F.2d at 522; O'Neil v. City of
Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Commentators often criticize judicial immunity as a doctrine imposed by
the judiciary for its own benefit to hide negligence and intentional mis-
conduct. 3 Judicial immunity, however, is not for the protection of
judges, but for the protection of the public, which has a strong interest in
an independent judiciary.4 Although individually wronged litigants can-
not collect damages for a judge's wrongful conduct, an alternative rem-
edy through the appeal system protects them." Similarly, the impeach-
ment process, the criminal system, and disciplinary proceedings protect
the public from corrupt or inept judges. 6
Under the doctrine as it exists today, two delimited requirements de-
termine whether judges may incur civil liability. 7 First, judges may be
subject to civil liability when they perform a non-judicial act.' Second,
judges may be subject to civil liability for any act performed in complete
absence of jurisdiction.
To decide whether an act is judicial, courts look to "the nature of the
act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and
to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity."20 In making this determination, courts have re-
lied on a number of factors, including whether "the events involved oc-
curred in the judge's chambers [and whether] the controversy centered
around a case then pending before the judge."'" As one scholar has
noted, in ascertaining whether conduct constitutes a judicial act, courts
generally construe the facts broadly in favor of immunity, 2 and in fact,
13. See Shaman, supra note 2, at 4.
14. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 349; Randall, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) at 536.
15. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227; Holloway, 765 F.2d at 522.
16. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227; Holloway, 765 F.2d at 522.
17. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 360 (1978).
18. See id. at 355-57; see also Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
19. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57.
20. Id. at 362.
21. McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972). This case introduced a
four-part test to determine whether:
(1) the precise act complained of, use of the contempt power, is a normal judicial
function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the con-
troversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the con-
frontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official
capacity.
Id. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have since used this test as well. See Ashelman v.
Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986); Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th
Cir. 1985); Adams v. Mcllhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692
F.2d 387, 396-97 (5th Cir. 1982).
22. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076; Adams, 764 F.2d at 297; Shaman, supra note 2, at 9.
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courts have found immunity to exist even where one or more of these
factors is not present. 3
Despite the tests formulated by the courts, authorities agree that it is
still somewhat unclear what constitutes a judicial act.24 Although no pre-
cise definition of a judicial act exists, clearly the immunity attaches to the
act itself, not the person performing the act. Thus, an act is not judicial
merely because a judge performs it.
Legal scholars and jurists have characterized non-judicial conduct as
1) conduct not requiring judicial discretion, or 2) highly aberrational be-
havior.26 Conduct which commentators consider non-judicial because it
does not require an exercise of judicial discretion or a determination of
parties' rights includes ministerial, administrative, and legislative acts.27
As one court noted, a judge does not "utilize his education, training, and
experience in the law" to perform such acts.2 Typically, a layperson
could perform these non-judicial acts. 29 Because these acts do not in-
volve any exercise of judicial discretion, the goal of judicial independ-
ence does not require that the law extend absolute immunity to them. °
Additionally, unlike traditional judicial acts, no alternative means of re-
view exists for such non-judicial acts.31 Thus, the law would provide no
remedy for a party wronged by a judge's administrative, ministerial, or
legislative acts if judges were immune from liability for such acts.
Courts have also characterized acts as non-judicial when judges have
engaged in "highly aberrational" behavior, such as performing arrests
23. See Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986); Holloway v. Walker,
765 F.2d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 1985); Adams, 764 F.2d at 297; Shaman, supra note 2, at 9.
24. See Block, supra note 2, at 916-21; Shaman, supra note 2, at 8; Joseph Romagnoli,
Note, What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity?, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1503, 1504 (1985).
25. See Shaman, supra note 2, at 8; see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228-29
(1988).
26. See Shaman, supra note 2, at 9.
27. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228-30 (noting that hiring and supervising court person-
nel is an administrative duty not entitled to the protection of judicial immunity); Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980)
(recognizing that promulgating attorney disciplinary rules is a legislative rather than a ju-
dicial act); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) (concluding that jury selection is a
ministerial act); see also Romagnoli, supra note 24, at 1508. For a discussion of the distinc-
tions between ministerial, administrative, and judicial acts, see ABIMBOLA A.
OLOWOFOYEKU, SUING JUDGES: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 34-38 (1993).
28. McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1986).
29. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229; Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
30. See McMillan, 793 F.2d at 155.
31. See id.
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and summary trials.32 Other examples include intentionally misleading
police officers as to the identity of a person named on an arrest warrant,33
physically evicting a person from the courtroom,3 and making deroga-
tory comments about a defendant to the press and city officials.33
Finally, the judge's motive does not factor into determining whether an
act is judicial. 3' Even a prior agreement defining the outcome of a case,
whether made out of malice or partiality, or pursuant to a bribe, will not
transform a judicial act into a non-judicial one.37 The judicial act analysis
focuses on the judge's ultimate act, such as rendering judgment in the
case, rather than on any underlying motive, such as bribery.8
In addition to the judicial act requirement, the doctrine of judicial im-
munity has a jurisdictional component. The courts generally agree that if
a judge does not lack subject matter jurisdiction completely, he is judi-
cially immune.39 There is also a distinction between acts performed in
32. See Shaman, supra note 2, at 9-10; see also Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396-
98 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that a justice of the peace's alleged arrest of four men at a gar-
bage dump, who then engaged in an automobile chase with one of the men and conducted
a summary trial was not a judicial act); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 859 (5th Cir.
1981) (concluding that a judge's jailing of a man for contempt when he entered the judge's
chambers to make an alimony payment to a court employee was not a judicial act); Lopez
v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235 (7th Cir. 1980) (determining that a judge's prosecuto-
rial conduct in determining the charges against an arrested man was not a judicial act);
Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1978) (describing how a traffic judge had a cof-
fee vendor brought to his chambers handcuffed, and then interrogated and harassed the
vendor about coffee the judge considered "putrid"); Krueger v. Miller, 489 F. Supp. 321,
329 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (holding that a justice of the peace acted outside the limits of his
lawful authority when he displayed a false badge and arrested a woman).
33. See King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir. 1985).
34. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir. 1974).
35. See Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 336 (7th Cir. 1979).
36. See King, 766 F.2d at 968 (finding that judge deliberately misled police into be-
lieving the man named on an arrest warrant was a man who had filed a complaint against
the judge); Harris, 605 F.2d at 333-36 (reporting that judge made repeated derogatory and
racially-based comments about police lieutenant to the press and city officials).
37. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a con-
spiracy does not pierce judicial immunity); Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that judges who conspire are immune if performing a judicial act);
Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding complaint alleging that
harm was inflicted by judicial acts to which absolute immunity would apply, although
caused by bribe or conspiracy, was insufficient to avoid judicial immunity); Sparks v. Du-
val County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1979) (determining that the advan-
tages of punishing those who subvert the judiciary outweigh any good conferred by a de-
rivative judicial immunity rule).
38. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1077-78.
39. See id. at 1076; Dykes, 776 F.2d at 948; Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1017 (2d
Cir. 1983). But see Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that acts
taken in the absence of personal jurisdiction are not protected by judicial immunity).
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excess of jurisdiction and those performed in complete absence of juris-
diction. Judicial immunity protects the former, but not the latter acts.4
In Bradley v. Fisher,4' the Court gave a helpful example to distinguish the
two: a probate judge presiding over a criminal prosecution acts in com-
plete absence of jurisdiction; however, a criminal court judge who con-
victs a person for a non-existent offense merely acts in excess of jurisdic-
41tion.
In Bradley, the Court stated that a judge is not immune from civil li-
ability when no subject matter jurisdiction exists and the judge is aware
41of its absence. Subsequently, some courts have held that a judge can
only act in complete absence of jurisdiction when he is aware that he
lacks jurisdiction or when he acts in the face of a clearly valid statute or
case law that deprives him of jurisdiction.44 Other courts, however, have
held that a judge's imputed knowledge plays no role in determining
whether the judge acted in complete absence of jurisdiction.45
Some of the most difficult questions a judge must consider relate to his
jurisdiction; therefore, courts broadly construe jurisdiction to achieve the
purposes of judicial immunity.4 Even grave procedural errors will not
deprive a judge of full jurisdiction for judicial immunity purposes. In
40. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1872); see also Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 n.6 (1978) (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-52).
41. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
42. See id. at 352.
43. See id.
44. See Rankin, 633 F.2d at 849; Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1980). In
Turner, the Fifth Circuit stated that one possible interpretation of Stump is that a judge is
only liable if he exercised unconferred jurisdiction in such a crass manner as to indicate he
did so either knowingly or recklessly. See Turner, 611 F.2d at 95. In the same year, the
Ninth Circuit, in Rankin, clearly stated a judge was immune unless he was aware he lacked
jurisdiction, or he acted in the face of a clearly valid law depriving him of it. See Rankin,
633 F.2d at 849. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits also adopted this position. See Mills v.
Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir. 1985); Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1497 (11th
Cir. 1984).
45. See O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1981). In O'Neil,
the Ninth Circuit contradicted its holding in Rankin by holding that a judge's intent does
not factor into the jurisdictional analysis. See id. The court reasoned that the Stump court
neither stated nor implied that a judge's knowledge of his jurisdiction affected his immu-
nity. See id.
46. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
47. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
357; King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 1992) (describing how judge ordered war-
rantless arrest); King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining that judge
jailed party for contempt when he was only authorized to impose fine); Lopez v. Vander-
water, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that judge conducted a trial in a police
station that fell outside his jurisdiction); King v. Thornburg, 762 F. Supp. 336, 338 (S.D.
Ga. 1991) (discussing how magistrate ordered the arrest of an attorney who failed to ap-
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fact, a judge of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over any matter un-
less the law specifically denies jurisdiction.4 Given this broad construc-
tion of the jurisdictional requirement, lack of jurisdiction rarely breaches
judicial immunity.49
B. Methods of Ensuring Judicial Accountability
Although judicial immunity is an absolute bar to recovering monetary
damages against judges, the legal and political systems make judges ac-
countable through other methods. First, judges are not immune from
awards of injunctive relief." Because judges need not fear the personal
consequences of an injunction, such immunity is not necessary to protect
judicial independence." Further, the Supreme Court has ruled that par-
ties may hold judges liable for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Awards Act.2 While such liability seems to threaten judi-
cial independence, the Court found that Congress specifically intended to
impose such liability upon the judiciary.3 As the Court noted, it is within
Congress' authority and discretion to abrogate the common law doc-
trine. 4
Although judges are generally not subject to civil liability, they are
subject to criminal liability. Judges remain criminally liable for fraud,
conspiracy, or any other crimes, even when they commit those crimes in
pear in court); Ross v. Arnold, 575 F. Supp. 1494, 1495 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (detailing how
judge in a divorce proceeding ordered the husband to vacate the couple's residence, and
upon the husband's refusal to vacate, ordered him incarcerated).
48. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 358.
49. But see Maestri v. Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying judicial im-
munity when town judge issued an arrest warrant for persons who committed offenses
outside his territorial jurisdiction); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 28 N.W.2d 780, 789 (Minn. 1947)
(explaining that judge acted wholly without jurisdiction by issuing an arrest warrant when
no written complaint had been made); State ex rel. Little v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 64 So. 2d 697, 702-03 (Miss. 1953) (finding judge liable where he knowingly drafted an
affidavit to state that an offense occurred within his jurisdiction when it clearly had not);
Vickrey v. Dunivan, 279 P.2d 853, 855-56 (N.M. 1955) (detailing how judge tried person
for an act performed outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction and which was not even an
offense); Utley v. City of Independence, 402 P.2d 91, 94 (Or. 1965) (describing how judge
completely lacked jurisdiction when he issued an arrest warrant without a written com-
plaint).
50. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984).
51. See id. at 536-38. The Court noted that judges have never been held absolutely
immune from injunctive relief and that there is no evidence that this policy has chilled ju-
dicial independence. See id. at 536. Furthermore, the stringent requirements for obtaining
equitable relief minimize the risk that judges will be harassed and judicial independence
compromised. See id. at 537-38.
52. See id. at 543-44.
53. See id. at 543.
54. See id.
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connection with the judicial office.5 The courts have found that provid-
ing judges with immunity from criminal liability would pose too great a
risk to the public interest in law enforcement.56 The limited exception to
this rule is that the law will not hold judges criminally liable for errone-
ous judicial acts performed in good faith.57
In addition to liability for their criminal behavior, society can hold
judges accountable for their misconduct through several other methods.
These methods include impeachment or removal from office and sanc-
tions imposed by organizations that regulate judicial conduct. For exam-
ple, Article II, Section IV of the United States Constitution provides for
removal of federal judges upon impeachment and conviction for bribery,
treason, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Most state constitu-
tions have similar provisions for legislative impeachment of state judges.
Some states provide additional methods of removing judges from of-
fice, although such methods are infrequently used.6° One procedure,
"Address to the Executive," occurs where both houses of the state legis-
lative body formally request that the governor remove a judge from of-
fice.61 A few states also provide for removal of judges by recall election.62
Under this procedure, only a designated number of voters' signatures
will secure that the recall proposition is put on the ballot. 3 The general
voting population then determines whether to remove the judge from of-
fice.'4 Finally, most states now have at least some elected judges, allow-
ing the public to "remove" judges by choosing not to re-elect them.
65
Commentators have criticized the above methods of impeachment and
55. See United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp 926, 930, 933 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
56. See id. at 934 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226-27 (1821)).
57. See Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945).
58. "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. It has never been disputed that
judges are civil officers for purposes of impeachment. See Harry T. Edwards, Regulating
Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87 MICH. L. REV.
765,773 (1989).
59. See Russell R. Wheeler & A. Leo Levin, Judicial Discipline and Removal in the
United States (July 1979) (paper prepared for the Fed. Jud. Ctr.), available in 1979 WL
24794.
60. For a general discussion of these methods, see Wheeler & Levin, supra note 59,
and Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1 (1977).
61. See Schoenbaum, supra note 60, at 4.
62. See Wheeler & Levin, supra note 59, at 4-5.
63. See Schoenbaum, supra note 60, at 8.
64. See id.
65. See Wheeler & Levin, supra note 59, at 5.
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removal, 66 labeling them cumbersome, time-consuming, and politically
motivated. 67  Additionally, the methods provide only for the extreme
penalty of removal from office, which is inappropriate in many cases. 6 If
the judge remains in office, he or she remains unpunished. Conse-
quently, state lawmakers rarely use these methods of judicial removal,
which contributes to their ineffectiveness.69
Recently, states have addressed the problem of judicial discipline by
adopting codes of judicial conduct and creating judicial conduct organi-
zations to enforce them. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, promul-
gated by the American Bar Association, has been adopted in full or in
part by forty seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judi-
cial Conference.7" Thus, virtually all state and federal judges are subject
to the Code,7' which provides that judges must uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary,72 avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety,73 and perform their duties impartially and diligently.74
Finally, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have established
judicial conduct organizations to investigate and adjudicate complaints of
judicial misconduct. 75 These organizations can compel sanctions or rec-
ommend sanctions to a higher body that imposes them.76 Possible
66. For an evaluation of several of the impeachment and removal methods discussed,
see generally Wheeler & Levin, supra note 59, and Schoenbaum, supra note 60.
67. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10 (1988).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 3; see also Yvette Begue & Candice Goldstein, How Judges Get Into
Trouble: What They Need to Know About Development in the Law of Judicial Discipline,
26 JUDGES J. 8, 9 (1987). Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have not adopted the
Model Code. See id. The ABA revised the Code in 1990, and since that time, nearly 20
jurisdictions have adopted new codes of judicial conduct modeled on the 1990 revision.
See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS, 573-75 (2000).
71. See Shaman, supra note 67, at 3.
72. See Begue & Goldstein, supra note 70, at 9.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Shaman, supra note 67, at 11.
76. See id.
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sntosicuecnue77 • 78sanctions include censure, suspension, and removal from office.79 In
the federal system, a judicial council in each circuit imposes sanctions for
judicial misbehavior80 Unlike the state judicial conduct organizations,
these councils do not enjoy the power of removal, although they can rec-
ommend the initiation of impeachment proceedings.8' Other sanctions
the council can enforce include recommendations to retire, suspending
caseloads, and censuring judges privately and publicly Commentators
consider sanctions the most effective method of disciplining judicial mis-
conduct.8"
Society, therefore, holds judges accountable to the public in a number
of ways. The legal system is designed to correct itself either through a
system of appeals or through the few limited circumstances when liti-
gants can hold a judge liable for his or her conduct through criminal
prosecution or disciplinary proceedings. Elected judges are also subject
to the political system, where opponents may expose judicial conduct in
an effort to prevent his or her re-election. These accountability measures
ensure that the legal system supports both individual and societal reli-
ance on the judicial process. Therefore, while the doctrine of judicial
77. See generally In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1990) (pri-
vately reprimanding a judge for creating appearance of impropriety by self-validating re-
duced airline tickets); Quinn v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 430 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y.
1981) (censuring a judge in connection with convictions for public intoxication); In re
Roth, 645 P.2d 1064 (Or. 1982) (censuring a judge in connection with conduct constituting
criminal mischief); In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992) (publicly reprimanding an associ-
ate judge for ex parte communications).
78. See generally In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185 (Or. 1994) (suspending judge from of-
fice for ex parte communications, failure to disqualify himself, and publishing comments
on pending cases); West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Comm'n v. Dostert, 271 S.E.2d 427 (W.
Va. 1980) (censuring and suspending judge for assisting officers with arrests and carrying a
weapon without proper license).
79. See generally In re Peck, 867 P.2d 853 (Ariz. 1994) (removing justice of the peace
for ex parte communications and failure to disqualify himself); In re Callanan, 355 N.W.2d
69 (Mich. 1984) (removing judge from office in connection with convictions for conspiracy
to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), aiding and
abetting RICO violations and aiding and abetting mail fraud); In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d
564 (Mo. 1976) (removing judge from office for breaking and entering); In re Coruzzi, 472
A.2d 546 (N.J. 1984) (removing judge from office after conviction for four counts of brib-
ery).
80. See Shaman, supra note 67, at 16. These councils are authorized by the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94
Stat. 2035.
81. See Shaman, supra note 67, at 16-17. Some question exists as to whether im-
peachment of judges, as provided in the Constitution, is the only constitutional method of
removing judges from office. See id. at 17.
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B) (1994); Shaman, supra note 67, at 17.
83. See generally Schoenbaum, supra note 60, at 1-2; Shaman, supra note 67, at 11.
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immunity greatly protects judges from civil liability, limited practices of
judicial accountability help to preserve the integrity and workability of
our legal system.
II. JUDICIAL LIABILITY IN ROMAN LAW
In ancient Rome, the concept of judicial liability developed as one
means of self-correction within the judicial process. Judges enjoyed a
kind of immunity from acts of misconduct arising out of their official du-
ties in an effort to protect the independence of the judiciary. Roman
law, however, held judges liable for dishonest and wrongful conduct rela-
tive to their resolution of cases brought before them. Over time, a sys-
tem of self-correction for judicial misconduct developed within the Ro-
man judiciary.
In the Roman legal system, parties established liability based upon
fault in a cause of action called the delict, which means "wrong." Gener-
ally, actions that arose ex delicto were civil as opposed to criminal wrongs
and usually threatened the security of an individual's rights. Originally, a
violent retribution requited a delictal wrong; eventually, less violent
means, such as monetary recompense, satisfied requital for such a wrong.
Significantly, the delict encompassed injury to an individual's rights as
well as harm to the state, and thereby served both a civil and criminal
function in society.
The ancient Romans also established tort-like judicial liability in ac-
tions that arose "as if from a delict" or quasi ex delicto. The quasi-delicts
encompass liability for careless conduct including liability for judicial
dishonesty. In Roman law, judicial liability was created by a quasi-delict
termed the iudex qui litem suam facit, which translates as a judge who
"make[s] a case his own."' This legal action has garnered substantial
scholarly recognition, but only in an attempt to reconcile it with the other
three quasi-delicts.8" Scholars, however, have given less attention to a de-
84. J. INST. 4.5. The Institutes of Justinian are the source for the term quasi-delict.
According to Justinian's compilation, a quasi-delict imposes liability on a defendant re-
gardless of whether that defendant caused the harm in question. See id.; see also BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCriON TO ROMAN LAW 224-25 (1962); J.A.C. THOMAS,
TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 377-79 (1976).
85. The four quasi-delicts are: iudex qui litem suam facit; res deiectae vel effusae; res
suspensae; and nautae caupones stabularii. See J. INST. 4.5; see also WILLIAM W.
BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN, 598-99
(1950); R.W. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 421 (1961); Peter Stein, The Nature of
Quasi-delictal Obligations in Roman Law, in 5 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE
L'ANTIQUITE' (1958); 8 DRAGONIR STOJCEVIC, SUR LE CHACTERE DES QUASI-DELITS
EN DROIT ROMAIN 57-58 (1957).
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tailed study of the legal significance of the iudex qui litem suam facit,
which merits a close examination. This Article analyzes this action as it
developed from the Republican through the post-Classical Periods in
Roman law. The scope of the iudex qui litem suam facit and its corre-
sponding sanctions during each period will receive particular scrutiny.
A. Republican Period: A Focus on Intentional Misconduct
During the Republican Period, beginning in approximately the fifth
century B.C. and extending to about 200 A.D., Rome defined itself as a
strong political entity both in Italy and abroad.8 At this time, the Ro-
mans codified centuries-old legal customs and traditions into a formal
written expression of the law known as the Twelve Tables. The Twelve
Tables is the source for one of the few proceedings in the Republican Pe-
riod that accomplished a limited type of judicial review.8 Roman law in-
voked this proceeding against the iudex qui litem suam facit. The Twelve
Tables states:
Dure autem scriptum esse in istis legibus quid existimari potest?
nisi duram esse legem putas, quae iudicem arbitrumve iure da-
tum, qui ob rem dicendam pecuniam accepisse convictus est,
capite poenitur... ? 8
How is it possible that these laws be considered harsh? Unless
you think that a law is harsh that punishes a judge or arbiter
with capital punishment, if he had clearly been shown to have
accepted money to influence his decision.
The tone of this passage implies that the Romans considered capital
punishment a suitable penalty for a judge who accepted a bribe. An un-
derstanding of the Twelve Tables in their entirety clarifies the appropri-
ateness of the sanction during the Republican Period. Many of the cus-
toms codified in the Twelve Tables reflected a primitive culture that
86. For extensive treatments of ancient Roman history, see generally 2 DONALD
KAGEN, PROBLEMS IN ANCIENT HISTORY (1966), CARL ROEBUCK, THE WORLD OF
ANCIENT TIMES (1966), MICHAEL CORANT, HISTORY OF ROME (Prentice Hall 1978),
and DAVID JOHNSTON, ROMAN LAW IN CONTEXT (Cambridge 1999). The historical
background for this Article is derived from these sources.
87. Besides the iudex qui litem suam facit the only proceedings in the nature of review
were the revocatio in duplum and a restitutio in integrum. Neither of these proceedings
addressed the wrong of judicial misbehavior. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 7 (1941).
88. AULUS GELLII, NOCTES ATTICAE, 20.1.7.
89. All of the English translations in this text are from the following texts, with some
modification: THEODOR MOMMSEN, DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Paul Krueger & Alan Was-
ton eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 1985), and EDWARD POSTE, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW BY
GAIUS (Oxford 1890).
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often used the death penalty as a means of retributive vengeance.9 The
sanction of capital punishment against a misbehaving judge preserves
this retributive purpose. As a legal penalty, it formally gave a wronged
litigant the opportunity to requite an injury caused by a judge's misbe-
havior.
Significantly, in the Twelve Tables, the sanction focuses on the manner
in which the judge acted rather than the correctness of his opinion. The
text does not discuss whether the decision of the corrupt judge is legally
correct.91 Rather, the passage stresses the behavior of the judge by use of
the Latin phrase ob rem dicendam accepisse convictus est. This phrase
means that the judge took money "for the purpose of making a biased
opinion." The Latin makes it very clear that the judge must have acted
intentionally because the grammatical function of the gerundive clause,
ob rem dicendam, indicates the purpose behind the verbal action of ac-
cepting money. Hence, by accepting the money with the purpose of fa-
voring one party, the judge committed an intentional wrong.92 Thus, the
Romans limited judicial liability during the Republican Period to the in-
tentional deviation from judicial impartiality motivated by the accep-
tance of a bribe.
It is significant that the scope of judicial misbehavior subject to pun-
ishment during the Republican Period was so limited. No system of ap-
peal existed during this period, and the alternative type of judicial review
available was narrow in scope. 93 The combination of these factors ex-
plains why a misbehaving judge endured such a severe sanction. By cre-
ating an action that harshly punished judicial misconduct, Republican
Rome produced a strong deterrent against such misconduct while giving
some means of recourse to litigants.
B. Classical Period: Judicial Liability Extended
The scope of judicial liability broadened during the Classical Period of
Roman law.9' A review of the sources from this period reveals that dur-
ing the Classical Period, a judge was liable for intentional, and perhaps
90. See HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW, 57-58 (1951).
91. See J.M. KELLY, ROMAN LITIGATION 110 (1966); see also RUDOLPH SOHM, THE
INSTITUTES, A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 424
(1907). See generally OTro LENEL, DAS EDICTUM PERPETUUM 136 (1927).
92. See KELLY, supra note 91, at 108-112.
93. See SOHM, supra note 91, at 288-89, 300-01.
94. See WOLFF, supra note 90, at 103-17. The Classical Period of Roman Law ex-
tended from the coming of the Principate to around the middle of the third century B.C.
See id. at 103.
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unintentional, acts of judicial malfeasance. One of the Classical sources
for the iudex qui litem suam facit is a passage in the Digest attributed to
Ulpian:9
Iudex tunc litem suam facere intellegitur, cum dolo malo in
fraudem legis sententiam dixerit (dolo malo autem videtur hoc
facere, si evidens arguatur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam
sordes), ut veram aestimationem litis praestare cogatur. 9,
A judge makes the case his own when from evil intent, that is a
bias due to friendship, hatred, or corruption, he gives a fraudu-
lent judgment, and he is condemned to pay the market value of
the thing in dispute.
Of central importance to this passage is the fraudam sentientiam or the
"fraudulent judgment" rendered by the judge. In the context of this pas-
sage, a fraudulent judgment is not necessarily a legally incorrect opinion.
Rather, the Latin word fraudam implies that the opinion was in some
way tainted or cheated of honest and impartial deliberation by the judge.
Ulpian further clarifies the nature of the fraudulent judgment by stat-
ing that the judge must intentionally depart from his duty to judicial im-
partiality. Ulpian establishes this by the phrase dolo malo, which means
injurious "evil intent."' Dolus, a noun that refers to the judge's state of
mind, is in the ablative case, which functions here to stress the conditions
under which the fraud was committed. Thus, regardless of the legal cor-
rectness of the decision, the judge would incur liability if a deceitful or
evil state of mind tainted his opinion.
To underscore the fact that the judge's perspective or evil intent is the
gravamen of the offense, Ulpian lists particular circumstances that may
have motivated the fraud: friendship (gratia), hatred (inimicitia), and cor-
ruption (sordes). For example, the judge's impropriety may have in-
volved an affirmative action, such as the taking of a bribe. Under such
circumstance, the presumption of dolus on the part of the judge would be
great.98 Alternatively, the judge's behavior could involve a less obvious
wrong, such as a narrow or harsh decision in a case due to a personal
bias.99 Because Ulpian establishes dolus malus as the source of fault for
the iudex qui litem suam facit, a number of different circumstances in-
95. See H.F. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAW 398-99 (1932). Ulpian's works are dated around the third century B.C. See id.
96. DIG. 1.15.1 (Ulpian, Edict 21).
97. See A.M. HONORE, GAIUS 103 (1962).
98. For a full discussion of dolus type situations, see the chapter on The Misbehaving
Judge in KELLY, supra note 91, at 102-17.
99. See id.
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volving intentional judicial partiality may give rise to judicial liability.
Consequently, the Classical Period witnessed a broader scope of judicial
liability than the Republican Period, which limited the scope to inten-
tional fraud, such as accepting a bribe of money.
Another passage of Ulpian speaks of the need for judicial liability due
to the possibility of unfairness or unskillfulness of a judge.'00 Still, Ulpian
does not mention the necessity of dolus. This passage reveals that one
should not read the foregoing passage of Ulpian as a definitional limita-
tion upon the iudex qui litem suam facit as it was known during his life-
time. Rather the inconsistencies between the two passages evidence a
transitional state of the law of judicial liability during the Classical Pe-
riod.' O'
A passage in the Digest, attributed to Gaius, illustrates this fluctuation
in the state of the law:
Debet autem iudex attendere, ut cum certae pecuniae condemna-
tio posita sit, neque maioris neque minoris summa posita con-
demnet, alioquin litem suam facit; item si taxatio posita sit, ne
pluris condemnet quam taxatum sit; alias enim similiter litem
suam facit. Minoris autem damnare ei permissum est.'O°
When a certain sum is laid in the condemnatio, a judge must be
careful not to condemn the defendant in a greater or lesser sum,
else he makes himself liable to damages: and if there is a limita-
tion he must be careful not to exceed the maximum, else he is
similarly liable.
If a judge improperly set damages, the judge assumed liability for
damages, which would be determined in accordance with the judge's de-
gree of fault.' °3 Curiously, Gaius makes no mention of intent in this pas-
sage. Such silence as to the judge's state of mind would allow liability to
attach whether the judge acted with dolus or mere negligence in the per-
formance of his duty.
Another passage attributed to Gaius, further defines the scope of the
iudex qui litem suam facit. It reads:
Si iudex litem suam fecerit, non proprie ex maleficio obligatus
videtur. Sed quia neque ex contractu obligatus est, et utique pec-
casse aliquid intellegitur licet per imprudentiam: ideo videtur
quasi ex maleficio teneri in factum actione, et in quantum de ea re
100. See DIG. 49.1.1. (Ulpian, Appeals 1).
101. See KELLY, supra note 91, at 111-13.
102. G. INST. 4.52; see POSTE, supra note 89, at 501-02.
103. See POSTE, supra note 89, at 510.
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aequum religioni iudicantis visum fuerit poenam sustinebit. °4
If a judge make a case his own, the obligation he incurs is not
created by delict, nor yet by contract, but as he commits a fault,
though it may be without intention, he is liable in an action in
factum for a quasi-delict to such damages as may be assessed.
The difficulty presented is that Gaius extends judicial liability to acts
that occurred unintentionally (per imprudentiam). Because Ulpian and
Gaius were contemporaries, it is unlikely that the former would limit ju-
dicial liability to intentional acts, while the latter would extend such li-
ability to negligence. To reconcile this inconsistency, scholars have re-
garded the portion of Gaius' passage from "the obligation" to "quasi-
delict" as an interpolation, or an insertion of text from an outside
source. °' Such reasoning is persuasive not only from a linguistic perspec-
tive, but also from an historical one.'O'
One scholar regards the interpolation itself as evidence of the transi-
tional state of the law during the Classical Period.' Nevertheless, even if
one disregards the interpolated portions of the passage, Gaius still makes
no specific reference to the necessity of dolus. The lack of such specific-
ity leads to differing interpretations of the passage. One may read it with
strict adherence to prior custom and argue that if the quasi-delict were to
extend its liability to unintentional acts, the author would have men-
tioned it specifically. An alternative reading favors the trend of the law
at that time and argues that because the quasi-delict broadened its scope
over time, the vagueness of Gaius' passage intended to allow for broad
interpretations including both intentional and unintentional acts.
Based on this passage of Gaius, however, the scope of judicial liability
was probably the same during the lifetimes of Gaius and Ulpian because
both authors of the Digest aimed to collect and interpret legal customs as
they had developed up to the second century A.D. As the empire grew,
a system of appeals began to emerge; 6 Gaius and Ulpian wrote during a
transitional period between the Republican Period, when there were no
appeals, and the later empire, when a system of appeals was fully devel-
oped. A legal system that lacked a system of review, as in the Republi-
can Period, posited greater power in the judiciary. Correspondingly, the
legal system of that period provided an alternative to a right of appeal,
the iudex qui litem suam facit, which provided a remedy for a specific ju-
104. G. INST. 44.7.5; 50.13.6.
105. See Stein, supra note 85, at 569-70.
106. See KELLY, supra note 91, at 111-14.
107. See id. at 112-14.
108. See POUND, supra note 87, at 8; see also THOMAS, supra note 84, at 121 n.25.
20001
Catholic University Law Review
dicial misbehavior, i.e., bribery. The death penalty sanction underscores
the importance vested in this remedy during the Republican Period.
Similarly, during the Classical Period, the iudex qui litem suam facit
existed as a remedy that served as an alternative to appeals. However,
because a system of appeals began to emerge during the Classical Period,
the pressure was not as great on that society to provide an alternative
method of review. Thus, although the iudex qui litem suam facit was still
a very viable action against a misbehaving judge, its symbolic value as the
guardian of judicial integrity diminished. Reducing the sanction from the
imposition of the death penalty to the assessment of a fine clearly illus-
trates this point.' °9
C. Post-Classical Period: Focus on Unintentional Misconduct
A final source of the iudex qui litem suam facit, which establishes judi-
cial liability during the post-Classical Period, appears in the Institutes of
Justinian."° The text is almost identical to that of Gaius in the Digest and
commentators have long agreed that Justinian relied heavily upon Gaius'
work.1' It is certain, however, that by Justinian's time the scope of judi-
cial liability extended to unintentional acts of the judge."' A close read-
ing of the Institutes elucidates what types of judicial misbehavior the
Romans included within the ambit of the iudex qui litem suam facit dur-
ing the later empire.
During that period, Roman law held the judge responsible for a male-
ficium although he was viewed as not having acted strictly from malefi-
cium. The word maleficium is very close in meaning to delict, that is, a
wrong or an evil deed. Because the "male" part of the word means evil,
maleficium means a deed that is evil in and of itself. In the Institutes of
Justinian, maleficium refers to judicial bias."3 Justinian introduces the
idea of fault by use of the verb pecasse, which means to do amiss, to mis-
take, or to transgress. Thus, during the post-Classical Period, the judge
109. For a discussion of the death penalty as an appropriate sanction, see KELLY, su-
pra note 91, at 109. For the evolution of the sanction to a monetary penalty, see DIGEST
OF JUSTINIAN 1.15.1, and POSTE, supra note 89, at 510.
110. The post-Classical Period begins with Diocletian and ends with Justinian's com-
pilation in 534. See FRITZ SCHULTZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 262-65
(1946).
111. See WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE
LAW 341 (1931).
112. See KELLY, supra note 91, at 114-15; see also WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, A
MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 330 (1925); JAMES MACKINTOSH, ROMAN LAW IN
MODERN PRACTICE 169 (1934).
113. For a discussion of maleficium, see HONORE, supra note 97, at 101-04.
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was liable for an error that rose to the level of a maleficium even though
he may have committed it through ignorance or imprudence.
Clearly, the scope of judicial liability broadened during the later em-
pire. The phrase per imprudentiam (unintentionally), which is definitely
a part of the Justinian passage and not an interpolation as it was during
the time of Gaius, imposed additional liability on a judge for a good faith
procedural error such as missing the day of trial or making a minimal er-
ror in setting damages.'14 Because the law required neither proof of
harmful intent (dolus) nor any mention of the degree of harm to a liti-
gant, the judge's vulnerability to suit was great. Two developments dur-
ing the later empire, however, balanced this vulnerability. First, litigants
had recourse to an appellate court if they felt wronged by a decision.'
Such a development would reduce the number of actions for personal li-
ability against a judge. Second, the sanction imposed upon the judge was
a fine in the amount of the litigation (if caused by dolus) or set by the
judge himself (if prompted by negligence). 6 The lack of severity of this
sanction is inversely related to the broadness of the judge's liability.
Therefore, while the scope of judicial liability was broadest during the
post-Classical Period, the penalty for judicial misbehavior was most leni-
ent.
III. CONCLUSION
The scope of judicial liability in Roman law covered a range of activity
including intentional and unintentional judicial misbehavior. The exten-
sion of judicial liability from clearly intentional acts of wrongdoing to
imprudent error created a broader base of judicial accountability. Two
other changes in the law accompanied this chronological development.
As the judge incurred greater liability for judicial misbehavior, the sanc-
tions imposed upon the judge became less severe and more compensa-
tory in nature. During the Republican Period, the scope of the iudex qui
litem suam facit was very narrow, yet its sanction was very harsh. Hence,
its legal purpose during that time was deterrence and retribution. During
the Classical and post-Classical Periods, its scope broadened, while its
sanction diminished. Roman law increasingly directed the sanction at
compensation of the litigant in an effort to preserve the integrity of the
legal system.
114. See SOHM, supra note 91, at 424.
115. See THOMAS, supra note 84, at 121; see also POSTE, supra note 89, at 632.
116. See POSTE, supra note 89, at 510; see also J.B. MOYLE, INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN
172-73 (Oxford 4th ed. 1906).
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This phenomenon in Roman law parallels the development of the doc-
trine of judicial immunity in the American legal system, where the avail-
ability of an appeal system gave rise to the concept of judicial immunity.
Currently, the status of judicial immunity is rather broad, thus providing
little recourse to litigants for misconduct arising from a judge's official
duties. However, similar to the philosophical and historical underpin-
nings of Roman society, American legal and political systems provide
numerous other measures of accountability in an effort to balance the
judiciary's need for independence with society's duty to redress the
wronged litigant.
